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Abstract: In common with most other authors, Mikhalevich & Powell assume that phenomenal 
consciousness is a “precondition” of moral standing. Although the evidence they present makes it 
much more likely than usually thought that arthropods are phenomenally conscious, scepticism in 
the face of this evidence remains intellectually respectable. I suggest that we best make progress 
here by rejecting the notion that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral standing. 
Mental states that may lack phenomenal properties can do a lot of work in grounding moral 
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“Phenomenal consciousness” (or “sentience”) refers to the qualitative feeling associated with 
some mental states. There is something it is like to be in these states: felt qualities are associated 
with listening to music, smelling flowers, maddening itches, and so on. While almost no one is 
sceptical that other normal human beings are phenomenally conscious, there is extensive debate 
about agents in pathological states (e.g., those in persistent vegetative states) and about other 
animals. 
These debates matter because phenomenal consciousness matters. It matters because 
phenomenal states seem to be intrinsically pleasant or unpleasant. Pain and pleasure are the 
obvious examples. Being in pain feels bad, and for that reason, to the extent to which someone is 
in pain, their life is going worse than it would otherwise; the reverse is true for pleasure, because 
it feels good. So knowing whether humans in pathological states or non-human animals are 
phenomenally conscious is important: it matters to how we should treat them. 
Debates over humans in pathological states remain unresolved, but there is a near 
consensus among scientists over the phenomenal consciousness of mammals and some other 
animals. Nearly a decade ago, the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al. 2012) 
summed up this consensus: consciousness extends beyond humans to mammals and birds “and 
many other creatures”. But which other creatures? The declaration explicitly mentions only 
octopuses. There is increasing acceptance that other cephalopods are phenomenally conscious 
too. But there is little willingness to ascribe consciousness to invertebrates.  
Focusing on arthropods, Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) set out to challenge this 
assumption. Those who deny that arthropods are conscious are usually ignorant of their cognitive 
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complexity. It is very likely that this ignorance helps explains why most people are confident that 
they are not conscious: we think of them as simple automata, whose behaviour consists of 
stereotypies and reflexes. The evidence M&P review for the existence of cognitive capacities like 
numerosity and the capacity to discriminate stimuli with no conceivable analogues in the 
environment to which they’re adapted (like impressionist versus cubist paintings) testifies to the 
complexity and flexibility of arthropod cognition. 
As M&P note, however, it remains possible to deny that arthropods are conscious in the 
face of this evidence. This would not be just idle scepticism, of the sort that points to the logical 
possibility that other people do not possess minds and concludes that we can’t know that we’re 
not the sole thinking beings in the universe. Since we have excellent reason to think that minds, 
including their phenomenal states, are realized by brains, and we know that other humans and 
many other animals too have brains like ours, we have reason to think that they have minds like 
ours. But we don’t have such reasons with regard to arthropods. Their brains are very different 
from ours, so we lack grounds for this argument from analogy. Things would be different if we 
were in possession of a well-founded and detailed neurofunctional account of consciousness, on 
the basis of which we could assess whether structures in arthropod brains played the right roles 
to realize consciousness. Although there are plenty of proposals around (the Global Workspace 
Theory (Baars 2005), Integrated Information Theory (Tononi et al. 2016) and so on), none have 
achieved consensus. 
In the face of this problem, M&P point to influences on our thought that might illicitly lead 
us to deny consciousness to arthropods (the disgust response, the unjustified belief that they lack 
complex cognition, and so on) and suggest that we ought to be less sceptical. They also point to 
moral risks here: false negatives have moral costs (in terms of the imposition of suffering, for 
example) that false positives lack, and urge us to assign significant weight to the possibility that 
arthropods are conscious in making decisions. All of that is well taken. But there is reason to think 
we can go further. 
M&P accept the near universal view that phenomenal consciousness is “a precondition for 
moral standing”. It’s this assumption that makes trouble, because we lack a detailed 
understanding of the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Fortunately, there are good 
reasons to reject the assumption. Perhaps phenomenal consciousness is sufficient for moral 
standing, but it is not a precondition. 
Much of the work done by appeals to phenomenal consciousness can in fact be done by 
functionalizable properties of the mind. Kahane & Savulescu (2009) argue, for example, that 
phenomenal consciousness is important because it is required for having a point of view. But 
that’s surely false: having a point of view requires some sort of cognitive unity and executive 
function, not phenomenality. Seager (2001) argues that only phenomenally conscious beings can 
value things. But that too seems false: having beliefs and goals seems sufficient for valuing states 
of affairs, and these are functionalizable states. 
More generally, there are good reasons to think that what our mental states feel like to 
us (if anything) plays only a minor role in whether we have lives that are valuable to us: whether 
we achieve a sense of satisfaction or frustration from failing to achieve our goals (Levy 2014). 
Satisfaction and frustration need not feel like anything: they can be cashed out cognitively and in 
terms of functional properties. Is it really an inner glow that makes achieving a long-sought goal 
valuable? Or is it the knowledge that we’ve worked hard for it and overcome obstacles? Is it really 
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a feeling that makes the death of a loved one bad? Or is it the knowledge that we’ll never see 
them again? Phenomenal consciousness may contribute a great deal to the (dis)value of these 
states, but they are good or bad for us to some degree independently of how they feel. 
Since it is not, or not only, the ways in which things feel for us that make them good or 
bad, we need not worry about the apparent ineffability of phenomenal consciousness. We can go 
a long way toward an inclusive animal ethics by studying only their cognition. Much of the 
evidence Mikhalevich & Powell should therefore be seen as bearing directly on the moral status 
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